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I would like to start with a general question about your position as a historian. Do 
you regard yourself as an economie historian or do you prefer to be described as 
a general historian? Or do you not attach any importance to the différence? 
I think the importance attached to that term 'general historian' is different to different 
people. I proudly call myself a card-carrying economie historian and I do not see any 
reason to think that to be specialized as an economie historian or a cultural historian 
or a political historian suggests some grave limitation to the point of being unable to 
address issues that go beyond the narrow compétence of economie history. I think 
specialization is a good thing and for the same reason that classical economists thought 
it was a good thing. But they also believed in free trade: there should be discussions 
and interaction among specialists and to that extent I think being a specialist, in this case 
an economie historian, is a strength rather than a weakness. Besides, I sometimes have 
to ask myself what it means to be a 'general historian'. 
When one looks at most recent historiographical surveys, one gets the impression 
that economie history, and especially what one used to call 'the new economie 
history', is in decline. Many people prefer not be called economie historians and 
to not have their books described as 'economie history'.1 Do you share this 
impression, and if so, do you have an explanation for this decline? 
Well, I think there are two issues here. One is the issue of specialization in general and 
the second is the current interest in or importance of economie history as one of those 
specializations. So, if we deal with the first more general issue, ï myself do not see any 
tendency among historians to avoid specialization; almost all of my colleagues 
describe themselves as a political historian, a cultural historian and so on. They do not 
usually call themselves general historians. 
But what is the reason so few of them call themselves economic historians? 
Well, that is the next issue, which is the position of economic history. I think that it is 
not the same in every country and that the reluctance to be described an economic 
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historian in the United States is not as great as you have just described it to be here. That 
is in part because most economie historians in the United States are economists by 
training rather than historians and they are addressing a different public to some extent, 
working with different methods. Perhaps they do not feel this malaise as acutely as 
economie historians working within history. In the United States, there is a definite 
tendency for historians to not describe themselves as economie historians, but that has, 
I think, quite specifie reasons. One is that these historians do not possess the technical 
training that the economist-economie historians have and so they have tended to move 
away from the field as a matter of competition. A second reason is that many of the most 
interesting - and that is where we are finally getting to the drift of your question -
historical works of recent years have a strongly cultural and subjectivist character. 
Economie history certainly in its quantitative and more or less positivist form seems 
unable to address the types of questions that most interest historians and the readers of 
history today. 
You are known as a historian who holds the view that an economie historian needs 
a training as an economist and who is in favour of an approach in which theories 
and model-building are important. More important than they are for instance in 
the work of Jonathan Israel, which is rather descriptive or interpretative. Do you 
still hold that view? 
I still would hold that view. I think I would describe the appropriate training and 
background of an economie historian today a little differently than I would have fifteen 
or twenty years ago, but I continue to believe that, not only in economie history but in 
all kinds of history, we have to bring to the historical material a tooi kit of methods and 
of theoretical understandings to try and make sense of the past, and that in the absence 
of that we work with half-formed, half-understood ideas, and unspoken biases, that 
only make the work of the historian more difficult and less satisfying. 
When discussing economie history of the early modern period, many people 
regard the serialist approach as the best, while especially Anglo-Saxon economie 
historians, for example Forster in his 'Achievements of the Annales-school', 
claim that from an economie point of view the serialist approach is not really very 
satisfactory.2 What is your opinión? 
I have some difficulty with the term 'serialist'. I am not quite sure what people mean 
when they use it, except to say that one is very much interested in the 'longue durée' 
and in long time series in history. I often work with time series, but that is not the same 
thing. I work with quantitative material and quantitative material need not be serial or 
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have that as its chief characteristic. There are many theoretical or more technical forms 
of economic history that I am very interested in, that do not have as their solé interest 
the construction or interpretation of time series. To the extent that quantitative 
economic history is reduced to a history of time series I think I could agree with Forster 
and anyone else who would regard that as unsatisfactory, limiting and theoretically a 
bit questionable. If serial history is part of a larger, quantitative and theoretical history 
I do not have problems with it. 
Could one deduce from this that you are not very impressed by the vvork of 
Fernand Braudel, not for the reasons Jonathan Israel gave, but for an opposite 
reason: you think it is not 'theoretical' enough?3 
Yes. Many years ago I wrote a book review of what were then modern works in 
economic history in which Braudel, a section of Braudel's Méditerranée, which had 
then not yet been translated into English, appeared along with the work of other 
Annales-school historians and I criticized it at the time because it seemed to me that, 
while addressing some of the things that have always fascinated me, it did not bring 
to the subject matter any well developed theoretical apparatus.4 As a consequence it 
tended, despite its pretensions, to be very descriptive, very ad hoc in its procedures. 
Ultimately it is impressionistic. So at the time I defined myself as someone who was 
trying to wed both the best of the Annales-school and the new economic history, an 
impossible task perhaps, but that is where I thought I fitted in. 
I suppose your criticism that the work of Braudel and other Annalistes is 
impressionistic and not really based on economic theory also applies to 
Wallerstein's books? 
With Wallerstein the situation is a bit different because he approaches the material in 
a much more structured way. There is a much clearer agenda involved in his work than 
in the case of Braudel. Impressionism is not the first word that comes to mind in 
describing Wallerstein, but my criticism of him, which I also made public in a rather 
lengthy book review shorfly after the first volume of his Modern world-system 
appeared, was based on the fact that his model did not seem to hold together.5 It did not 
seem to have the content of economic reasoning that could explain the phenomenon 
that he was purporting to explain. So it seemed to me that, apart from all the historical 
problems - mainly questions of fact and interpretation of a traditional historical type 
- the theoretical apparatus he was bringing to bear was simply inadequate to the task 
and only confused matters. 
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Many people who criticize a more theoretical approach in economie history do 
so because they say modern economie analysis is not suited for analyzing early 
modern history. Would you agree and would that imply that you think that one 
needs models that are specifically adapted to the early modern period?6 
The unsuitability of modem economie theory to historical work is the reason I am not 
an economist but an economie historian. I tend to agree with the criticism that the most 
influential stream in economics, neo-classical thought, is quite explicitly a-historical. 
Ho we ver, thereare, in the large, ratherrich literature of economie theory othertheories, 
some now not as much favoured as neo-classical theory, that do have a specifie 
historical content. I think the social sciences in general, not only economics but 
sociology and political science as well, need a greater historical grounding in their 
theoretical development. So, to me, being a social-scientific historian, is not simply to 
say: 'I am such an admirer of social science theory that I want to apply these wonderful 
theories to history'. It is rather that I am interested in the enterprise of social theory. I 
see inadequacies in those theories, in part because of an absence of a satisfactory 
historical grounding, and I want to see what can be done about that. Now aspiring to 
be a social theorist on one' s one, to develop new theories that are historically grounded, 
is obviously a great ambition. I am not sure that I am capable of contributing much in 
that direction, but one goes step by step. What one can do in a more limited way and 
what I have tried to do, is to use those theories that seem to have a historical appl icability 
and that do not seem to hopelessly distort our understanding of the past but can in some 
way enrich it. I want to show the possibilities of those theories, but also their limitations. 
Now, neo-classical theory, despite its a-historical character, can have limited 
applications in understanding particular problems that people in the past faced. They 
faced problems of scarcity and choice just as in a text-book example of modem micro-
economics the owner of a firm or a consumer faces choices and constraints. Clarify ing 
them, seeing what the trade-offs are, and examining human behaviour in this rigid 
framework can, I think, have rich rewards. In my book on the trekschuiten, Bar ges and 
capitalism, I used some rather elementary theory of the firm, that I had learned when 
I was a student, to try and understand the pricing policy, the tariffs that were established 
for passenger transportation.7 These were established by the cities and the barge-
operators had to live by the tariffs that were officially set. They sometimes complained 
that they were too high or too lo w and that they needed to be changed and so they would 
write letters petitioning forchange, usually an increase, to the city. If I had not studied 
as an economist I suppose I could have simply interpreted these letters as some kind 
of a power-struggle or a political issue between these two parties. But then it would 
have been hard to judge who was right or wrong and to understand what were the 
consequences of the policy set and what would have been the consequences of the 
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alternatives. That is, full understanding of the issue, in my view, could not nave been 
achieved. 
The objection that these barge-men in the seventeenth century themselves did not 
know about cost curves, marginal pricing, theories of monopolistic pricing and all the 
other issues that could have been raised, is, it seems to me, not relevant. The fact that 
they did not express themselves in these terms does not mean that they did not face the 
objective issues that are described by these theories. And so in this sense it seemed to 
me perfectly reasonable and not anachronistic to apply this kind of model, even though 
it is not itself a historical model and even though the people at the time perhaps did not 
have an understanding of the issues as fully developed as they are in modern economic 
literature. 
You already mentioned the word 'politics', which introduces another theme in 
the discussion wifh Jonathan Israel, the theme of the relationship between 
economics and politics. It is perhaps possible to sepárate politics f rom economics 
on an analytical level. But do you think the historian could also sharply 
distinguish between these fields in practice? 
No one could deny that this isa problem. A common complaint about economic theory, 
particularly neo-classical economic theory, is that it cannot account for power as an 
independent factor. In economic models the various interactions seem to be govemed 
by scarcities, by supply and demand factors. The power of the economic actor is, as 
it were, to the extent that it exists at all, simply subsumed in the context of the economic 
dimensions of the issue. To the extent that these criticisms are correct, it is a great and 
constant danger for historians to loóse sight of the obvious: the relations among 
individuáis in society have other dimensions besides the strictly economic. Economic 
issues can be overridden by the exercise of political power. To some extent the role of 
the political historian is to admonish the economic historian with: 'You do not fully 
understand the issue. You have not taken the political factors into account'. This kind 
of challenge is sometimes correct and calis to our attention issues that the economic 
historian stands in danger of ignoring. 
So far, I accept that kind of criticism. I see it as a danger for my specialization and 
believe that we occasionally stand in need of correction. The other side of the coin, 
however, is this: Political power and political events - as treated by the what I will cali 
now not the general, but the political historian - are often treated without any reference 
to the economy while they are often explainable, or partially explainable, by underlying 
economic factors. The options open, in terms of the exercise of political power, are 
generally severely constrained. That is, just because you want to do something, it does 
not mean that you are able to do it. And the inability to do something often has to do 
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with one's economic position. To say that France closes her markets, and that this is 
a political fact that the economic historian concemed with numbers somehow just 
looses sight of, is by itself not a sufficient statement. Why did France cióse her markets 
then, and not before? And why was she successful in doing so then and not before? 
Why does she change her policy again some time later on? There are, not always, but 
often, economic facíors that account for this. 
If economic history by ignoring politics can give a sterile and misleading account 
of history, political history in which political events are pulled like a rabbit out of a hat 
to announce that now everything has changed, a new phase has been entered and so 
on and so forth, is not satisfactory either. In a way it suffers from the same probiems. 
If we are trying to explain economic phenomena, it is to my mind desirable to try and 
make endogenous to the economic account those political issues that obviously 
intervene and help shape the course of economic history. I do not mean to say by this 
that every political issue is reducible to its economic components. But they are in many 
cases to some extent grounded on or shaped by those factors. It is the task of any 
historian, and here is where the issue of general history might come in, to bring them 
together and not to treat the one as somehow sovereign or privileged in the account of 
historical change. 
One of the key factors behind the transforma tion of the Dutch rural economy was 
the fact that economic development in the Duích Republic, or to be more precise 
Holland, was not 'hindered' by a feudal structure.8 That is, in effect, a political 
'fact'. Does that mean that for this question politics were, in some respect, 
fundamental in explaining economic development? 
Yes, if you say that this absence of a well-developed feudal system in Holland must 
be accepted as a political fact. If one were writing an economic history from, say, 1500 
onwards, inevitably one would have to accept this absence of feudalism as a political 
fact and start out from there. But anyone who is looking at the history of medieval 
society would have to ask himself why feudalism was not so important in Holland. 
Then it ceases to be a political fact and becomes a problem that requires explanation. 
And there might be many factors, including political factors, that contribute to such 
an explanation. But, there will also be economic ones. 
Slicher van Bath wrote an article that I have always found quite intriguing, called 
'Boerenvrijheid'.9 In it he pointed out that farmers, or peasants, were free of feudal 
controls, not always entirely, but to a large extent, not only in Holland, but in several 
other parts of Europe: in the Alps, in parts of Sweden, in northern England. He had a 
whole list of regions. And then he asked himself: 'What do all these áreas have in 
common?'. Some were in mountains, others in marches. They were not contiguous but 
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spread out all over Europe. So, clearly, he had a bit of a challenge to explain it. 
Ultimately, he identified the one thing these áreas all had in common as, what we would 
today cali, the occupation of ecological niches, in which dairying, or live-stock raising 
was the dominant form of subsistence for the population, rather than settled arable 
agriculture. He went on to try and draw a link between the economic basis of these 
communities and the political forms that controlled or failed to control them. I do not 
mean to argüe here that his argument is persuasi ve in every way and that this is the only 
explanation. But it is an example of a systematic comparative history trying to find the 
links between what, on the face of it, are unlike, different phenomena. He tries to find 
certain underlying pattems. I believe that is an important task of the historian. 
When one talks about economics and politics, one of the main themes in the 
history of early modern Europe is the emergence of the mercantilist state. Do you 
regard the Dutch Republic as, in some ways, a mercantilist state? 
I do not often use the term mercantilism. Not only in application to the Dutch Republic, 
but also more generally in discussing European history, perhaps because the -ism at 
the end suggests something much more structured and well-defined both in our eyes 
and in the eyes of those who practised mercantilism than I think it really was. Still, the 
term has its uses and I think it is fair to say that the economic thinking of the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century that we usually describe as mercantilism had a clear 
influence on policy makers in the Dutch Republic. There were many occasions when 
the same kind of 'mercantilist' policy was discussed and even implemented in the 
Dutch Republic as we see elsewhere. In this sense, the Republic was part of its time 
and influenced by its environment and not something ideologically opposed to the 
world around it. However, there were clear limits, in comparison with other countries, 
to the implementation of these policies in the Republic. They usually were not carried 
so far, they were not so drastic, and they were not so successful. 
That raises the question of what it was about the Dutch Republic that made 
mercantilism not fully at home there. I think, to the extent that it was not fully at home 
in the Republic, it was not because its leaders nurtured some alternative visión and were 
ideologically opposed to mercantilism. I think they faced objective situations which 
made it difficult to pursue the economic advance or strength of their society via the 
same kind of measures that many other European states attempted to implement. 
We will now embark on a different subject, the rise and fall of the Dutch economy. 
Let us start with your position as a historian, once again. I do not think you would 
like to be described as a 'trade historian', whatever that may mean. You have 
written about agriculture, about transport, about urbanization, you published a 
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gênerai survey of the European economy between 1600 and 1750. Is this by 
accident, purely a matter of personal préférence, or is it because you think that 
thèse subjectsare more important than trade, which has always aroused so much 
interest in other historians? 
First I should say that, although you are correct that I would not call myself a specialist 
in the history of foreign trade, in my current project, which is to write a gênerai 
economic history of the Dutch Republic, together with Prof. Van der Woude, it became 
my task to write the chapter on trade.101 became fascinated by this subject and wrote 
a chapter that was much too long for our book and will have to appear, or at least part 
of it, in some other form. S o l have spent a lot of time recently on the subject and I find 
it enormously interesting. However, you are right in that I came very late to spending 
a lot of time in doing research on this subject myself. That has to do not so much with 
a feeling that trade is unimportant,but with a feeling that it has to be placed in a context. 
What is interesting to me about trade is not the flows of goods across the seas and 
the rich merchants who finance it and draw their profit from it, but the domestic 
économies that give rise to thèse trade-flows both through their own production and 
export and through their needs for and ability to acquire goods from abroad. The pay-
off of trade history is to be found in some kind of territorially based, economy-based 
history. It seems to me it was precisely in this area that the economic history of the 
Dutch Republic had so many gaps and was most in need of development. The trade 
history seemed to float unconnected to the domestic economic history of the country. 
What I wanted to know was how trade changed society and how society gave rise to 
trade. I did not want to treat trade as some kind of disembodied essence that floats 
around the world and sometimes settles on one place and sometimes on another. It 
seemed to me that to understand the totality of the economy, we needed to know more 
about agriculture, but also, about industry, domestic distribution, urbanization and 
demography. A i l thèse relatively domestic issues needed to be fleshed out further so 
that we could understand the totality of the economic history of the Republic. 
When trade has been placed in its context, would you agrée with Jonathan Israel 
that the rich trades were more important, in whatever way one should measure 
their importance, than the bulk trades, or do you still think that the bulk trades 
were more important? 
I would prefer not to answer this question in this form, because of the dichotomy 'rich 
trade' - 'bulk trade' that I find not to be a useful distinction. As I mentioned in my talk 
last week, the specific character of the substance traded is by itself not of critical 
importance. What is important, as I mentioned then, is the profitability of trade. That 
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is terribly important for any dynamism in trade history. Trade is not going to grow if 
people cannot make a profit from conducting it. Secondly what is important is 
innovations in markets. Trade is intimately connected with markets. If there is an 
intégration of distant markets and a réduction of the costs of trade, of what are called 
the transaction costs that are associated with the movement of goods from one place 
to another and with their distribution, this can have tremendous conséquences for the 
volume of trade and for the introduction of new goods in distant markets. These things 
have to do with economie change and development and they interest me much more 
than the lucky event that a trade in some precious commodity, which had been located 
in Antwerp or in Lübeck, now happens to have landed in the pockets of a merchant in 
Amsterdam. That fact in isolation does not strike me as a terribly interesting one. 
Placed in some broader context, it might end up being important. 
By itself, as the chief aim of one' s research, I am not sure why we should be terribly 
interested in that. Unless one's chief interest here is not so much economie history, but 
the history of certain types of people. If you say, 'I am really interested in the élite 
merchant families of Europe and I wonder how it is that they all gathered in Amsterdam 
for a time before moving on', and then you find that 'This seemed to be the best place 
to carry on business in silk, diamonds and fürs' well then you have explained why a 
European merchant élite moved to, or sent some of its members to, Amsterdam. But 
if you are concemed with the dynamics of economie development of a society, then 
that might be a useful fact or it might not, and we need to know more. That cannot be 
the end of the story. 
What is interesting and important about the fact that these traders are in Amsterdam 
and that they control certain commodity-flows is not whether these are rich or bulk 
goods, it has to do with the profits of those goods, with the innovations of those 
merchants in developing those trades, and ultimately with the connection between 
those trade-flows and domestic production and consumption. Once you have made all 
those connections, then trade history, to my view, becomes interesting and important. 
But the very terminology, rieh trade - bulk trades, élite merchant - other merchants, 
does not seem to me designed to lead us into those interesting forms of investigations. 
It seems to invite to stop short of that, to stand back and be satisfied with the knowledge 
that rich and powerful figures have suddenly appeared. 
I suppose what you think is interesting in the economie history of the Dutch 
Republic is what one has called the 'Dutch miracle', the oíd question of the rise, 
and the decline, of a small economy in the northwestern part of Europe. The last 
part of our interview is concerned with questions related to this problem: How 
could one explain the rise of the Dutch economy, which factors were important 
in it? and secondly: How could one explain its decline, or its relative decline? Was 
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it more or less 'inévitable' for such a small state as the Dutch Republic to loose 
its primacy once the other, bigger states, France and England, were ready to 
compete with the Dutch or were there 'internai' reasons for it? 
You use the word primacy. That complicates any answer that I can give. Last monday 
we did not much discuss the use of the term 'primacy'. If we take the simple-minded 
définition of being a single dominant element in European trade, more important than 
any other single nation, then I think it can be said that the Dutch Republic held that 
position in most trades and that it was inévitable that it would loose it. But, all kinds 
of things, you might say, are inévitable. Herodotus said that good fortune never seems 
to stay long in one place. It always moves. Then there are two subsidiary questions that 
have to be asked, which are: If it was inévitable that it was to loose primacy, was it also 
inévitable that it should loose prosperity? And, secondly : If it was inévitable that it was 
to loose primacy, when did it happen, and what was the occasion for it to happen? That 
is, when something is inévitable but will not happen for two hundred years it is a lot 
different than it being inévitable and it could happen any minute now. So the question 
of the timing of this loss of primacy and the fact that the Dutch lost a lot more than 
primacy makes the question, I think, historically more interesting. 
Should we not begin by trying to explain what it was that gave the Dutch, I do not 
think one should say primacy only in trade, but such a flourishing economy, 
before discussing its décline? In your book on Dutch agriculture, you stress the 
importance of specialization in agriculture. That is one of the basic pillars. The 
other pillars one can find in your work are the existence of a highly developed and 
technologically advanced industry, the Dutch trade-system and the availability 
of peat as a cheap source of energy.11 
Those are what I would regard as important factors. They are ail domestic factors that 
in my view help explain why the foreign trade of the Dutch Republic became 
something other than, and more than, the foreign trade of a Lübeck, or for that matter 
of an Antwerp, in the sixteenth Century. Which gets us back to the matter we were 
discussing before. When trade-flows are connected to a productive economy, when 
they foster economic specialization and increase the productivity of the population, 
they become a more interesting and more lasting phenomenon than when this is not 
the case. That is why I have always been interested in examining the domestic economy 
rather than remaining fascinated by the flows of trade, and not penetrating beyond the 
port cities, or even the harbours of the port cities, to what lay behind them. 
But there is another matter that is important and I try to stress this in my book on 
European urbanization.12 To put it more simply than I would like to: at the time of the 
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Dutch Revolt there was an opportunity for the diversión of certain kinds of trade from 
their established routines. Political history plays an important part in this. When 
Professor Israel or anybody else says that this is not simply a matter of economic 
history, I agree. And since I am not capable of doing full justice to the political side of 
the story, I certainly do not have any objection to someone else doing so, fleshing it out 
and thereby making this whole history richer and better. 
The multi-centred urban system of the sixteenth century, which was to a very large 
extent related to the political structure of the Habsburg Empire and its rivals, faced a 
crisis: a political crisis, but also, in certain regions of Europe, an economic crisis. This 
crisis undermined the strength of long-established cities like Antwerp, Augsburg and 
Genoa, that had exercised economic leadership both in the Mediterranean and in 
Northern Europe. In the context of that crisis the revolt of the Dutch against Spain took 
place. And without trying to present a narrative of this history I simply want to say that 
the coming together in time of an independent Dutch Republic, with its established, 
albeit relatively modest, trade and this 'decentring' as Braudel called it, this 'instability 
of the multi-centred urban system of Europe' as I have called it, created possibilities 
for Holland and Zeeland that they would not have had at other times. 
This is an historically unique situation. This unique opportunity did not necessarily 
have to fall into the lap of the Dutch Republic, there were rivals. If we talk about élite-
merchants and rich trades, one might say that given these unique opportunities all these 
merchants landed in Amsterdam and once they were there with their contacts around 
the world and their large amounts of capital, they tumed Amsterdam into something 
it had never been before. This seems to say that wherever such merchants land, they 
créate, as though by their simple presence, a new economic power. To me the sudden 
emergence of so many new economic initiatives in the Dutch Republic, and especially 
in Amsterdam, from the 1590s on has to be understood in the larger context of rivalry 
and its 'window of opportunity'. 
The Dutch Republic had advantages that were based on some of the characteristics 
its economy had acquired in the past. Here the so-called bulk trades and the commercial 
tradition with its shipbuilding and its regular market-activity rather than the use of 
periodic fairs, imparted on the new, now much more expanded trade that occurred after 
1590, a character that it had never had before in one located in a town like Lübeck, 
Antwerp or even Venice. It is this economic, but to some extent also political and 
institutional, structure of the new Republic that gave it advantages in the competition 
during this unsettled period. 
To the extent that we want to speak of a 'Dutch miracle', it was the coming together 
of these things, this specific conjunction, that was, I would not want to say 'miraculous', 
because I think it can be explained, but at least unique. Now, something that is unique 
cannot be explained theoretically very easily. You cannot find comparable elements 
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in the story. One can use theory to deal with certain aspects of this problem, but when 
one integrates all the different things happening at the same time into some kind of 
totality, as an historian must, one ends up with an irreduceable element of creativity. 
Theories and model-building ultimately at some point fail us. They can be used to 
structure the argument, set the terrain and say how things are related to each other, but 
I think we can not quite use a structured, model-building theoretical approach to show 
how all these things carne together. 
Could one say, to put it rather bluntly, that the explanation for the decline of the 
Dutch Republic - be it absolute or relative - can be given by just reversing all the 
factors that are normally mentioned in explaining its rise: a fast growth of the 
population giving way to demographic stagnationand even decline: aspecialization 
in agriculture becoming a hindrance to further industrial development because 
it absorbs the peasants in the countryside and thereby deprives industry of its 
supply of cheap labour: an industrial supremacy based on technological superiority 
and competitive wages coming to an end because of technological stagnation and 
high wage-rates: a supremacy in international trade disappearing because 
fundamental changes in international political and economic relations undermine 
the Dutch position as the carriers of the world? Did not in time all the factors that 
promoted Dutch economic growth in one way or another become obstacles to its 
further development? 
If you want to suggest that there is something inherent in the process of growth that 
gives rise to its opposite, I would like to place some question-marks after such a 
statement. To a certain extent it is true. But that is abit like say ing: 'What goes up, must 
come down', as I did in answering your earlier question. 
The problem as I see it, is that no economy that is growing keeps on growing on 
the same basis forever. But that does not mean that once basis A has ceased to be a real 
growth-stimulus, the economy ceases to grow. What often happens, is that there are 
new stimuli to growth that succeed A, and that in fact the very earlier growth of A makes 
possible its own destruction, but also the creation of growth-element B, and so on and 
so forth. This does not mean the growth necessarily continúes forever, but it can go on 
for quite a long time. Normally economists believe that to have developed a system of, 
say, railways puts an economy in the position of developing technologies and 
advancing market-integration that will make it easier to adopt automobiles and 
airplanes and that an economy without railroads will find it more difficult to do so. To 
take us back to the seventeenth century we might ask:' Why are the growth-stimuli of 
the first half of this century, as they became exhausted, in so few instances replaced 
by new ones?', 'Why is this transition not made?'. 
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To my view one of the limitations of Dutch économie history in discussing the later 
'stagnation and decline phase' is that it is almost always cast in terms of: ' Why could 
the old growth-sectors not have continued on?' or: 'How long did the old growth-
sectors last?'. 'Did they really begin to decline in 1670, or did they remain important 
to 1730 or even 1780?'. It is as though the économie history of the whole Dutch 
Republic, from its political beginning to its political end should be seen as the rise of 
a certain complex of factors in the first half of the seventeenth century and what 
happened to those same factors through time. There is hardly any room in this account 
for the discussion of change and innovation after 1650. It boils down to a well-rounded 
story of a sudden création of a certain complex of économie factors and then the fate 
of those factors as time goes on. 
This économie 'rise and decline' seems to fit with the political history of the rise 
and decline of the state. This also implies that the économie history of the nineteenth 
century has to be seen as something new because then the state is somefhing new. I 
think that we have here an example of the undesirable influence that political history 
- via its dominant role in establishing periodization - often has on our ability to 
understand that certain important économie or social characteristics transcend political 
breakpoints and that économie history does not always have the same periodization as 
political history. 
It is worth considering two facts. First that although there are important new 
developments in the Dutch economy having to do with its achieving primacy in the 
décades after the revolt, there is a strong degree of continuity. This primacy was built 
upon its earlier achieved commercial, industrial and agricultural abilities in the first 
two-thirds of the seventeenth century and in fact going back to fifteenth century. The 
more information we get about the Late Middle Ages, the more we see that there is a 
long continuity. But this system is no longer capable of developing itself any further 
after, roughly, the middle of the seventeenth century. Then, and this is the second fact 
worth considering, there is a real breakpoint and we see new initiatives and important 
changes in the structure of the Dutch economy. It is to a very large extent a new 
departure. It ends up by not being a very successful one, but it is a new departure 
nevertheless. When one only regards it as the lingering on of an old system, one misses 
the essence of the late seventeenth-century and early eighteenth-century Dutch 
economy. To the extent that Dutch économie history has been constrainedby apolitical 
periodization we have not been able to see clearly some of the most important changes 
in it. 
But whatever periodization one chooses I think one cannot avoid the question 
why the Dutch, having the most advanced economy in the seventeenth century, 
had no 'industrial révolution' in the eighteenth century, while the English did. 
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No one would deny there was no industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century in 
the Netherlands. B ut the attempt to explain this fact becomes a little different if one uses 
the periodization I suggested. One then does not quite so quickly simply observe that 
already long before the beginnings of an industrial revolution in England economic 
growth in the Dutch Republic seems to have petered out and that a conservati ve attitude 
of holding on to an old system which obviously would preclude the initiatives of 
modem industrialization would somehow account for this 'missed opportunity'. Then, 
to my mind, it becomes a little more interesting. If the Dutch are building colonial trade, 
trying to develop a West-Indies trade and are re-orienting their trade both to more 
distant and more nearby markets, just as the English were doing in the eighteenth 
century, then suddenly Dutch economic history looks a lot different in relationship to 
industrialization than it did before. But I should not pursue this point much further, it 
is not enough developed in my mind. 
The main reason I raise it is that the death of any kind of history, including economic 
history, is to be forever wedded to the same old questions. If they are not the right 
questions the whole literature becomes sterile. Therefore it is important that we should 
have books like Jonathan Israel's. They raise issues people thought had been settled 
long ago and shake us up a bit to look at things again. That is terribly important. 
However, I think that if we do that without a theoretical apparatus the discussion cannot 
be extended very far. It then ends up in absolute statements and visions. 'My vision of 
history is this': I hate that statement. It precludes discussion. You cannot take it apart 
and improve on it. 
I think in his latest book Van Zanden throws some new light on the 'rise and 
decline issue' by stressing the importance of the availability of cheap labour in the 
rise of the Dutch economy and then relating its disappearance to the specialization 
that took place in Dutch agriculture.13 In his opinion the Dutch rural economy of 
the sixteenth century (at least till around 1580) was still characterized by a system 
of 'proto-industrialization'. In the process of specialization that he thinks began 
at the end of the sixteenth century the undifferentiated peasantry was absorbed 
into specialized activities in the countryside or else moved into the towns. In this 
interpretation of economic developments during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries specialization became an obstacle to the formation of a Dutch industrial 
capitalism because it precluded the further development of a system of 'proto-
industrialization' which according to him is the only system 'gekenmerkt door 
een eigen dynamiek die kon leiden tot de overgang naar een "moderne indus-
trie'".14 
Well, I do not agree with that. This is a complicated issue. A great deal of what he says 
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in his description of the Dutch economy in the sixteenth and early seventeenth Century 
I agrée with. I think he has added to our understanding of that period. But he loads far 
too much explanatory weight on the process you just mentioned and I think he 
describes it in a too one-sided way. In a nutshell I guess the basic problem is this: I 
describe sixteenth-century rural development as one of 'specialization', while he 
describes it as one of 'proletarianization'. To a certain extent they are the same thing. 
My specialists, at least some of them, were commercial farmers, they owned or rented 
their land and owned their cattle and equipment. No one would call them proletarians. 
But those who were not farmers increasingly were divorced from the land and found 
employment in a whole variety of rural crafts and services, not in proto-industry in the 
sensé we usually use the word, but, to use a modem term, one might say that they 
developed a specialized service-sector for commercial agriculture and for certain 
industries and trades that were carried on in the rural economy. 
I have always preferred to emphasize the specialized character of this because to 
a large extent this rural, non-farming population was not simply day-labourers 
working on farms, that is, they were not simply an agricultural prolétariat working on 
estâtes or on the large farms of others which I think Van Zanden tries to suggest a large 
part of them were. Rather they were predominantly craftsmen or eise working in the 
transportation sector, in food-processing, or in other sectors related to food-production. 
They worked for wages or piece-rates, or they were 'zelfstandigen', independent 
operatives. No one would claim they were necessarily rich. But in my view this 
specialization gave them the means to live in a way that was better than the desperate 
poverty of the very small peasant with not enough land and without the ability to invest 
in improving the productivity of his land and capital-stock. 
So by stressing specialization rather than proletarianization I was try ing to suggest 
that this differentiated occupational situation in rural Holland was a kind of success-
story, that it indicated a measure of economie development. Well, by stressing 
proletarianization Van Zanden wanted more to speak of the exposure to market forces 
and the vulnerable position of people having no longer direct access to the means of 
production, i.e. land. 
He regards this as very important because of a second factor, which again he gives 
more importance than I think sensible, that is self-provisionment, especially the self-
provisionment of food, in a pre-industrial economy. An economie word for it is 
'dualism': on the one hand a household is engaged in production for the market, its 
members work for wages and enter the market with their goods, while on the other hand 
it produces at least a portion of its food on its own farm, so that for these goods it is not 
dépendent on the market. 
I think this dualism is not unique to a pre-industrial or even a pre-capitalist 
economy. Families in modem society ordinarily have a kind of dualism too. There is 
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self-provisionment in the home of all kinds of goods and services that one might buy 
on the market. Instead people organize their households in such a way that they are able 
to produce a certain amount for themsel ves by, for example, preparing food and taking 
care of the children. But Van Zanden in his analysis pushes this issue very far. Once 
people no longer have access to their own means of food production - to some extent, 
he is not very clear on when exactly that point is reached - this dualism breaks down 
and they are utterly dependent on the market. Then in his view, given the conditions 
of that time, they are no longer capable of reproducing themselves. He thinks their 
employers can neverpay them enough to permit them to acquire the food, clothing or 
housing they could provide more cheaply when they still had direct access to the land. 
So to the extent that specialization, or as Van Zanden would say 'proletarianization', 
continues, it knocks down the pillars of future economie development. Once it lias 
proceeded far enough, labour has become too expensive to be competitive. It then 
cannot reproduce itself whereby demographic gro wth, which can also be an important 
source of economie dynamism, weakens. 
Well there are all kinds of questions one might ask about this model, but let me be 
very short and say why I prefer to speak of 'specialization'. I believe that the process 
of specialization, through its efficiency- and productivity-increasing effects, could 
permit production to take place on a competitive base and could provide a Standard of 
living for wage-earners that was above subsistence. 
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